Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive which performs encryption and signature in a single logical step with the cost lower than signature-then-encryption approach. Recently, Li et al. [35] proposed the first provable secure identity based signcryption without random oracles. In their scheme sender signs the ciphertext. However, in [11] Boyen showed that non-repudiation is easily achieved if the sender sign the plaintext rather than ciphertext. In this paper we proposed an identity based signcryption scheme without random oracles, which provides the non-repudiation with respect to plaintext. We also proposed an identity based public verifiable signcryption scheme with third party verification in the standard model.
INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality and authenticity of a message are achieved independently by public key encryption and digital signature respectively. There are scenarios where both confidentiality and authenticity are needed simultaneously (for example secure e-mailing). Earlier signature-thenencryption approach was followed to achieve both primitives. However, this approach has a high computational cost and communication overhead. In 1997, Zheng [1] proposed a novel cryptographic primitive "Signcryption" which achieves both confidentiality and authenticity in a single logical step with the cost significantly lower than 'signature-then-encryption' approach. Security notions for signcryption were first formalize by Beak et al. [2] i.e. semantic security against adaptive chosen cipher text attack and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack. Many public key signcryption schemes have been proposed after [1] . Some of them are [3] [4] [5] [6] .
In 1984, Shamir [7] introduced the concept of identity based cryptography. In the identity based cryptosystem public key of users are their identities (e.g. email address, PAN number etc.). Shamir gave an identity based signature (IBS) scheme in [7] , but he cannot find any concrete scheme for identity based encryption (IBE). The first identity based encryption (IBE) scheme was given by Boneh and Franklin [8] in 2001. The first identity based signcryption (IBSC) scheme was proposed by Malone Lee [9] in 2002 along with a security model for signcryption in identity based setting. Since then, many IBSC schemes have been proposed in literature [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] .
However, most IBSC schemes were proven secure in the random oracle model [17] . Although, in the random oracle model one can construct the efficient and provable secure schemes but a proof in the random oracle model only provides the heuristic security. Canetti et al. [18] showed that when random oracles are instantiated with concrete hash functions, the resulting scheme may not be secure. Many cryptographic schemes are proposed which are provably secure without random oracles (or in the standard model). Some of them are [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] . By combining Waters' [23] IBE scheme and Paterson and Schuldt's IBS scheme [22] , Yu et al. [24] proposed an IBSC scheme in the standard model. Many authors proved that their scheme is not secure [21, [28] [29] [30] [31] . Among them Zhang [30] and Jin et al. [21] Recently, Li et al. [35] proposed an efficient IBSC scheme without random oracle based on Kiltz and Vahlis's IBE scheme [36] and Paterson and Schuldt IBS scheme [22] . In their scheme, sender signs the ciphertext which provides existential ciphertext unforgeability i.e. nonrepudiation for the ciphertext. In [11] , Boyen noticed that this might difficult the task of receivers who want to convince a third party of the sender's authorship for an extracted plaintext. In this paper we first propose a provable secure IBSC scheme without random oracles which has existential signature unforgeability i.e. non-repudiation for the plaintext. Further, we also propose an identity based public verifiable signcryption (IBPSC) scheme with third party verification without random oracles. In the public verifiable signcryption scheme a third party who is unaware of the receiver's private key is able to verify whether a cipher text is valid or not and in third party verifiable signcryption schemes, a third party is able to verify the integrity and origin of the message using some additional information along with the signcryption provided by the receiver other than his/her private key. Signcryption schemes with these additional properties have applications in filtering out the spam in a secure email system and private contract signing [16] . This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we give the formal definitions of IBSC schemes and their security model. Section 3 contains the preliminaries for the proposed schemes. In section 4, we propose the new IBSC without random oracle and prove its security. In section 5, we propose the identity based public verifiable signcryption scheme with third party verification without random oracles. We conclude this paper in section 6.
FORMAL MODEL OF IBSC SCHEME
An identity based signcryption (IBSC) scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
Setup:
This algorithm takes input a security parameter k and outputs the system parameters params and a master secret key. The notion of security with respect to confidentiality is indistinguishability of encryptions under adaptive chosen cipher text attack (IND-CCA2). For IBSC this notion is captured by the following game played between challenger  and adversary  .
Key Generation

GAME 1 (IND-CCA2):
Initialization:  runs the setup algorithm on input a security parameter k, gives public parameters params to the adversary  .  keeps the master key secret.
Queries (Find Stage):
The adversary  makes the following queries adaptively. 
Definition 1:
An IBSC scheme is said to IND-CCA2 secure if no polynomially bounded adversary  has non-negligible advantage of winning the above game.
Note that the confidentiality game described above deals with the insider security since the adversary is given access to the private key of the sender * A ID in the challenge phase.
Signature Unforgeability
The notion of security with respect to authenticity is existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA). For IBSC this notion is captured by the following game played between challenger  and adversary  .
GAME 2 (EUF-CMA):
Initialization: Same as in GAME 1.
Queries:
The adversary  asks a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively as in GAME 1. The adversary  's advantage is its probability of winning the above game.
Definition 3:
An IBSC scheme is said to EUF-CMA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary  has non-negligible advantage of winning the above game.
Note that in the cipher text unforgeability game described above deals with the insider security since the adversary is given access to the private key of the receiver
ID in the forgery. ( , ) 
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Security Analysis of proposed IBSC scheme
Our proofs of the security of the proposed IBSC scheme without random oracles depends on [22] [23] [24] . 
,
Note that these public parameters will have the same distribution as in the game between the challenger and the adversary  . Furthermore, this assignment means that for an identity u and any bit string M, we have
Furthermore, the master secret key will be 2 Otherwise the  chooses a random u R p r   and computes the private key corresponding to identity u as
The distinguisher  returns this private key to the adversary  . As in the Waters' proof [23] and Paterson's proof [22] , let 
